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regarding how to spend their retirement assets. The distribution decisions they make at or near retirement 
can significantly affect both their retirement incomes and the benefits paid to survivors or heirs. Yet very 
little is known about how DC plan participants actually choose to receive distributions from their 
retirement assets, when a wide array of annuity options is made available to them. Using unique historical 
data from a major DC pension provider (TIAA-CREF), we document and discuss the income elections of 
participants over the period 1978-2001. We show that, following the introduction of non-annuity income 
options in 1988, there was a significant decline in the use of life-contingent immediate annuity income 
among those initiating periodic withdrawals from their retirement accounts. Differences in choices by 
option and accumulated asset amount are described by demographic characteristic. Patterns may have 
relevance to policymakers, as they continue to evaluate the role of DC pension systems and life annuities 
in the provision of retirement income. 
Disciplines 
Economics 
Comments 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2004 publication: Pension Design and 
Structure: New Lessons from Behavioral Finance. 
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/434 
Pension Design 
and Structure
New Lessons from
Behavioral Finance
EDITED BY
Olivia S. Mitchell and 
Stephen P. Utkus
1
Utkas-Fm.qxd 27/5/04 3:24 PM Page iii
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide in
Oxford New York
Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai
Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi
São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto
Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and in certain other countries
Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York
© Pension Research Council, The Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania, 2004
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above
You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Data available
ISBN 0-19-927339-1
Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India
Printed in Great Britain
on acid-free paper by
Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk
Utkas-Fm.qxd 27/5/04 3:24 PM Page iv
Part IV
Implications for Retirement Payouts
Utkas-13.qxd  27/5/04  3:06 PM  Page 235
Utkas-13.qxd  27/5/04  3:06 PM  Page 236
Chapter 13
How do Retirees Go from Stock to Flow?
John Ameriks
In funded defined contribution (DC) pension systems, plan participants
accumulate assets in designated accounts over time for use in retirement.
Given the tax subsidies accorded to these saving mechanisms, it seems clear
that a first-order public policy issue is whether DC pensions and other
retirement savings will enable retirees to maintain an “adequate” flow of
consumption in retirement. Indeed, in both the popular press and the
academic literature, there has been a great deal of focus on this question
(cf. Easterlin, Schaeffer, and Macunovich, 1993; Engen, Gale, and Uccello,
1999; Moore and Mitchell, 1999; Warshawsky and Ameriks, 1999; Holden
and Vanderhei, 2002; Wolff, 2002).
In order to assess the adequacy of retirement saving for the support
of consumption in retirement, it is clearly necessary to specify, or model,
saving behavior prior to retirement. It is also important to model spending
behavior after retirement. It seems fair to say that assumptions made about
retirement spending behavior have remained relatively unnoticed in the
policy debate regarding the “adequacy” of retirement savings. For example,
many assessments or estimates of the “adequacy” of DC pension plans often
presume that retirees will use their retirement plan balances to obtain a life
annuity (e.g. Holden and Vanderhei, 2002). Many well-known commercially
available retirement planning software programs designed to assess retire-
ment savings adequacy utilize similar assumptions. Such an assumption is
consistent with the simplest form of a life-cycle model of consumption, in
which there is no bequest motive (Brown et al., 2001).
Yet such an approach is likely to be too simplistic, in view of the fact that
many retiring workers seem to maintain at least part of their retirement
assets for purposes other than the immediate purchase of a stream of life-
contingent income payments at the time they retire. Because many people
appear to strongly desire alternatives to life annuities as a distribution mech-
anism for their retirement assets, the question arises as to how people will
choose to utilize the stock of assets that they have accumulated in their
The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not represent the opinions of his 
current or past employer. The author is solely responsible for any errors.
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pension accounts to finance an “adequate” flow of consumption in retirement.
In a recent paper, Munnell et al. (2002) argue that as people are given more
control over how they dispose of their pension plan assets, psychological or
behavioral biases may lead them to (i) elect to receive distributions from
their retirement plans as “lump sums”, and (ii) subsequently choose to
save too much of those assets (i.e. reduce their consumption below what is
optimal). Indeed, this argument is similar to the argument that behavioral
biases may cause undersaving before retirement. If behavioral biases lead
some individuals to undersave before retirement, is it not also possible that
other biases could lead them to underspend in retirement? Others believe
that the form of benefits in retirement is not a significant issue, and that such
choices are simply a reflection of differences in preferences.
Here, we do not intend to resolve this debate, since doing so would require
extensive data on all sources of wealth, coupled with detailed information on
consumption, that we currently lack. Instead, we focus on an examination of
the range of distribution mechanisms used by TIAA-CREF participants. These
data illustrate the extent to which retired and retiring individuals in a DC
pension arrangement utilize a variety of different mechanisms to finance
flows of income in retirement. These mechanisms include a range of annu-
ity options, as well as many forms of distributions that do not involve a life-
contingent form of income. The evidence indicates some striking trends
over time. In particular, following the introduction of non-annuity income
options in 1989, there has been a significant decline in the use of immediate
life-contingent annuity payments among those beginning to take periodic
income from their retirement accumulations. In addition, the data show
significant variation both over time and by demographic characteristics in
the types of income options chosen by participants.
Retirement Rates and the Changing Nature of
Retirement
When people move from the “accumulation” phase of a pension arrange-
ment to the “distribution” phase, it generally involves a transition from work
to retirement. Before examining patterns in the use of income options, we
briefly review participant retirement patterns. There has been a large
decline in the retirement rates of TIAA-CREF participants aged 69 and
above since 1987, apparently related to the end of mandatory retirement in
higher education in 1994 (Ameriks, 1999). Researchers also showed that
over the same period, there was very little change in the retirement rates
among participants younger than age 69. A larger study of faculty members
also showed a similar pattern, with most of the decline in retirements at
later ages concentrated at large research universities (Ashenfelter and Card,
2002). Figure 13-1 presents updated information on estimated rates at
which participants retired in the year 2000. The base for each percentage
238 John Ameriks
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Figure 13-1. Estimated retirement rates for TIAA-CREF participants by sex, 2000.
Notes: Data show the fraction of each age/gender group who were making contributions to a TIAA-CREF pension annuity contract in 1999 but not in
2000. This is an estimate of retirements occurring in each year based on available data; contributions may of course stop for many reasons, but at the
ages listed are likely to be largely a result of retirements.
Source : Author’s calculations based on TIAA-CREF data.
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(the number of “workers”) in each group is the number of individuals who
made any contribution to a retirement annuity contract in the year 2000,
and the numerator (the number who “retire”) is the number of those same
individuals who either (i) no longer had a deferred annuity contract at
TIAA-CREF as of 2001, or, (ii) remitted no additional contributions on
their retirement annuities for the entire calendar year 2001.1
The most interesting aspect of these data is that retirement rates for all
ages are similar to those documented earlier (Ameriks, 1999).2 Women are
slightly more likely to “retire” than men at all ages, there are peaks at typical
retirement ages (62, 65, and 70), and age-specific retirement rates are all
within few percentage points of earlier estimates. Overall, these data suggest
that the incidence of “retirement” has changed significantly (declined) only
for those aged 69 and above.
One difference is that older individuals appear to be waiting to begin
receiving any form of income from their retirement assets. For women aged
65, the fraction of retirees starting to receive distributions within a year of
retirement fell from 89 percent in 1987–90, to 81 percent in 1994–96; for
men aged 65, the decline was from 90 percent in 1987–90, to 82 percent
in 1994–96 (Ameriks, 1999). More recent data for those retiring at age 65
in 2000 confirm the trend: Among men, 78 percent received some form of
distribution by the end of 2001, while among women, only 72 percent
elected to receive some form of distribution by the end of 2001.
Retirement Income Options
We now turn to data regarding the patterns in the selection of income
options by those who have elected to begin an income stream. The data we
use for this case study are drawn from TIAA-CREF (Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund). This is a not-
for-profit organization and it is the largest private pension provider in the
United States, managing nearly $300 billion in total assets for more than
2 million individuals. TIAA-CREF serves mostly employees at institutions of
higher education and research, the majority at private institutions, where the
sponsor offers a variety of investment options through employer-sponsored
pension arrangements. Through such plans, participating employers and
employees may make periodic contributions to accumulate assets for use in
retirement. For many participants, these assets represent a major source of
retirement income, in retirement as the assets are accumulated as a part of
an employer-sponsored pension arrangement, rather than a supplemental
arrangement (in contrast to many private-sector 401(k) plans).3 Participants
can choose from among several distribution options:
Life Annuity Options
Two types of annuities may be used by participants to generate life-contingent
income: A single-life annuity, which will provide income as long as the
240 John Ameriks
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annuitant is alive; and a joint-life annuity, which provides some income
payments as long as either of two annuitants (typically an individual and
a spouse) live. Three different survivorship options are available under the
joint-life annuities; the option selected determines the level of payments
made following the death of one of the annuitants: The “Two-thirds to
Survivor” option provides for two-thirds of the annuity benefit to continue
to the survivor. The “Half to Second Annuitant” option specifies that if the
primary annuitant pre-deceases the second annuitant, one half of the
annuity benefit will be paid to the survivor; however, if the second annui-
tant predeceases the first, there will be no change in the benefit.4 Finally,
the “Full to Survivor” option provides for no change in the benefit upon
the death of either one of the annuitants.
Because annuity assets are pooled, some retirees worry that in the case of
a very early death, they will “lose” the assets used to purchase an annuity. In
other words, some view purchase of an annuity as a “risky” proposition,
rather than a means to reduce risk. One way that insurers deal with this con-
cern is by giving annuitants the option to elect a guarantee period, or perhaps
more accurately a “minimum payment period” when beginning an annuity
income stream (either single or joint-life). This period is simply a length
of time during which income payments will be made to the annuitant(s)
or a designated beneficiary, regardless of whether the annuitant(s) is alive.
In other words, during the guarantee period, income payments from the
annuity are not life-contingent. If the annuitant(s) dies before the end of
this guarantee/“minimum payment” period, payments will continue to a
designated heir or other beneficiary. After the expiration of the guarantee
period, continued payments are, however, contingent on the life of the
annuitant(s).5
Payments under each of these annuity options are supported in large
part by the pooling of mortality/longevity risk across annuitants unique to
the life annuity. Because life-contingent annuity income payments are only
made to living annuitants, periodic payments to annuitants can be higher
over their expected lifetimes than would be possible in the absence of such a
pooling arrangement.6 In the absence of strong bequest and precautionary
motives, there should be significant demand for such arrangements among
individuals who are risk averse from the point of view of economic theory
(Yaari, 1965; Brown, Davidoff, and Diamond, 2003; see also Brown et al.,
2001). Yet the size of the immediate annuity market is strikingly small.
A number of empirical studies have analyzed aspects of the operation and
pricing of annuities offered on the private market in an attempt to resolve
this apparent puzzle (cf. Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990; Mitchell et al.,
1999; Brown et al., 2001). This research has illustrated that the implicit cost
of private annuities has varied significantly over time and across carriers,
and it depends heavily on the individual’s private assessment of his own
mortality prospects. These studies have concluded that while pricing issues
may indeed make purchase of an annuity unattractive to some individuals,
13 / How do Retirees Go from Stock to Flow? 241
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theory would still suggest much greater demand for immediate annuities
than is currently observed.
Variable Annuity Payments
An important feature of TIAA-CREF’s pension annuities is that all involve at
least some variable component. This means that the level of annuity income
received by annuitants may change over time, based on overall performance
of the annuity investment accounts (for CREF annuities) or dividend credit-
ing rates (for TIAA annuities). Retirees choose whether such changes will
regularly occur either on a monthly basis or an annual basis. For immediate
annuities based on CREF accounts, initial income payments to annuitants are
set using a current mortality table and an assumed interest rate of 4 percent.
Annuity payments may then rise or fall to the extent that the overall per-
formance (investment performance, mortality experience, and the expense
experience) of the account since the last payment change exceeds or falls
short of the assumed rates. If overall performance of the account exceeds
the 4 percent assumption, the next income payment will be higher than the
last. Similarly, if it falls short of the assumed 4 percent, the payment will be
lower. This form of annuity can lead to volatility in payment levels over
time, but it allows the annuitant to maintain exposure to the financial risks
and return of various investments if so desired, while reducing exposure to
longevity risk.7
In contrast to CREF annuities, TIAA annuities provide a minimum guar-
anteed amount of income as well as a variable component. The income
change process for the variable component of TIAA annuities involves a
significantly more complicated set of calculations than for CREF annuities,
though the principles involved are similar. TIAA annuities have historically
generated significantly lower levels of income volatility from period to period
than CREF annuities (King, 1995; Hammond, 1996). Two types of payment
distribution methods are used with TIAA annuities: a “standard” method,
intended to generate a stable level of nominal payments, and a “graded”
payment method, designed to generate a stream of increasing payments to
at least in part offset adverse effects of inflation (cf. King, 1995).
Annuitants may choose to receive variable annuity payments from CREF
investment accounts based on stock market investments, historically less
volatile assets such as bonds, or use payments from TIAA to obtain a guar-
anteed income stream. They can also elect to receive income from a combi-
nation of these accounts and can mix several sources of income to create an
overall “income portfolio.” In addition, annuitants can change or period-
ically “reallocate” the combination of accounts that they use during the
payout process, if desired. Over 95 percent of those receiving life annuity
income receive at least some payouts from TIAA, and more than half receive
at least some income from CREF. Detailed patterns in the portfolio-related
242 John Ameriks
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details of annuity income decisions are an important area for future
research, but they are beyond the scope of this chapter, which focuses on
how annuity and non-annuity options are used, as opposed to investment
allocation decisions across those categories.
Non-Annuity Options: IPRO, MDO, and SWAT
In addition to the variety of life-annuity options, non-annuity options
became available in 1989, following the introduction of the Interest Payment
Retirement Option (IPRO). This enables retirees at least age 55 but younger
than 6912 to choose to receive the interest credited on their TIAA traditional
annuity accumulations as income. Under this income option, the principal
amount of the TIAA accumulation is preserved until a later date, when it
must be either converted to a life annuity, a Minimum Distribution Option
(MDO) contract, or otherwise withdrawn. The option was intended for use
by those who would like to begin to receive some income from their retire-
ment accumulations but might not yet desire to begin a life annuity.
The MDO contract was introduced in 1991. Federal regulations require
that most retirement plan participants receive (and include in their taxable
income) minimum distributions from their tax-deferred retirement assets
by April 1 following the year they retire, or the year they reach age 7012–
,
whichever comes later.8 Those who do not satisfy the requirements are sub-
ject to a nondeductible tax penalty equal to half of the amount that should
have been distributed. The MDO mechanism provides income payments
from accumulated retirement assets that are just large enough to avoid
the federal tax penalties associated with failure to take distributions from
tax-deferred retirement assets at the required rate. Unlike the IPRO, a parti-
cipant beginning an MDO contract may have the option, but is not required,
to change to another distribution option. The minimum distribution program
can be subsequently converted to a life annuity in most cases; alternatively
it can continue as long as assets remain to be distributed.
Systematic Withdrawals and Transfers (SWAT) were automated in 1996
and have been used increasingly ever since. Under this systematic withdrawal
plan, a participant simply selects a schedule payment amount to receive
(specifying either a fixed dollar amount, or a percentage of assets, as desired).
These regular withdrawals or transfers will then be made from the accumu-
lations according to that schedule, as long as assets remain. The level of these
withdrawals must meet the minimum distribution requirement for those sub-
ject to it, or a tax penalty will apply. The participant can change the schedule
of withdrawals as desired and retains the flexibility to convert to other
options at a later date if desired.
This chapter focuses on the use of the life annuity, MDO, IPRO, and SWAT
options, as each of these options generates a periodic stream of retirement
income.9 The issue of to what extent participants use various forms of ad hoc
13 / How do Retirees Go from Stock to Flow? 243
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or lump-sum distributions is an important one, but it is beyond the scope of
the current article. Without detailed additional survey data from individuals,
there is no way to determine how, or even if, withdrawals or rollovers from
TIAA-CREF are ultimately spent, converted to annuities, or otherwise utilized.
The Level of Income Payments
When making a decision regarding an income stream, participants must
decide how much periodic income the choice will generate. Several options
are available.
Life Annuities
The level of initial income provided by a life annuity depends on several
factors. For example, the level of income obtainable from a single-life
annuity is based on the survival probabilities of one individual, while a
joint-life annuity reflects the expected survival/mortality patterns of two
individuals. In addition, the interest rate used to price the annuity is an
important factor, and the election of guarantee periods and various sur-
vivorship options (for joint-life annuities) are also a factor in determining
the size of the periodic income payments. Finally, all TIAA-CREF pension
annuities involve at least some variable component, so income after the
first year of payments may change to the extent that investment perform-
ance or dividend crediting rates change.
Table 13-1 compares initial income streams obtainable from a hypothetical
single life annuity at various starting ages, with various guarantee options.
Table 13-1 shows the amount of initial income available from a single life
annuity, based on three different interest rate assumptions and three differ-
ent retirement ages. It also shows how payment levels are affected by the
addition of a guarantee period. Finally, it should be noted that in general, as
a result of federal law, the sex of the participant can be used in the deter-
mination of annuity benefit levels from retirement plan assets, as unisex
mortality tables must be used to price the annuity income flow. This table
illustrates three points:
1. Initial income payments per dollar annuitized grow as the interest rate
rises used to price the annuity. For example, for a 65-year-old, a 4 percent
interest rate generates payments of $686 per year per $10,000 annuitized.
This rises to $830 at 6 percent, and $982 at 8 percent. Thus the initial rate
at which the annuity is issued has a large impact on the level of starting
income.
2. The size of initial income payments per dollar annuitized rises as the
age of the annuitant rises.
3. Having a guarantee option lowers the amount of income payable by the
annuity at any given age and interest rate. The cost of the guarantee
244 John Ameriks
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rises with participant age, in terms of the level of payments relative to
an annuity with no guarantee period.
Table 13-2 presents a similar comparison for a joint life annuity. Here,
the baseline level of income is for a “Two-thirds to Survivor” option without
a guarantee period. Table 13-2 does not show how interest rates affect pay-
ments as it assumes a 6 percent rate; however, the relation is similar to the
single life-annuity case. Table 13-2 does show similar patterns with regard
to annuitant age and the election of a 20-year guarantee period. It also
shows that the age of the two annuitants and the particular survivorship
option elected can interact to raise or lower the level of income relative to
the baseline case.
Income from Non-Annuity Options
The level of initial income available from non-annuity pay out options
generally does not depend on as many factors as are involved in annuity
calculations. In the case of IPRO, the amount of income is dependent on
the participant’s accumulation in TIAA and current interest rates credited
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TABLE 13-1 Initial Hypothetical Single-Life Annuity Income Levels by Interest
Rate, Annuitant Age, and Guarantee Period
Interest Rate Annualized
and Age Income Per
Payment Level w/Guarantee Period
$10,000 None 10 years 15 years 20 years
(in $) (%) (%) (%) (%)
4 percent
Age 65 686 100.0 97.8 94.9 90.9
Age 70 780 100.0 95.9 91.0 84.8
Age 75 913 100.0 92.4 84.4 75.7
6 percent
Age 65 830 100.0 97.6 94.9 91.4
Age 70 923 100.0 95.7 91.1 85.8
Age 75 1,056 100.0 92.3 84.9 77.5
8 percent
Age 65 982 100.0 97.5 94.9 92.0
Age 70 1,072 100.0 95.6 91.4 86.9
Age 75 1,203 100.0 92.2 85.6 79.3
Notes : Annualized income above is monthly income times 12; not a once-a-year annual
annuity payment. Payments are based on Annuity 2000 Mortality Table (Merged Gender
Mod 1) with ages set back 2 years. Listed percentages are a percent of the annualized
amount of income for each row.
Source : Author’s calculations.
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TABLE 13-2 Initial Hypothetical Joint-Life Annuity Income Levels by Annuitant Ages, Survivorship Option, and Guarantee Period
(Assumes Interest Rate of 6%)
Age of Primary and Annualized Two-thirds to Survivor Half to Second Full Benefit to Survivor
Secondary Annuitants Income Per Annuitant
$10,000
No 20-Year No 20-Year No 20-YearAnnuitized
Guarantee Guarantee Guarantee Guarantee Guarantee Guarantee(in $)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Primary 65
Secondary 65 794 100.0 98.9 97.9 97.1 92.0 90.6
Secondary 70 830 100.0 98.3 95.2 94.0 90.9 88.7
Secondary 75 872 100.0 97.3 92.0 90.3 89.0 85.9
Primary 70
Secondary 65 830 100.0 98.3 100.0 98.7 90.9 88.7
Secondary 70 874 100.0 97.2 97.4 95.4 90.4 87.0
Secondary 75 925 100.0 95.7 94.2 91.3 89.1 84.0
Primary 75
Secondary 65 872 100.0 97.3 102.6 100.5 89.0 85.9
Secondary 70 925 100.0 95.7 100.1 96.8 89.1 84.0
Secondary 75 988 100.0 93.3 96.9 92.1 88.6 80.9
Notes : Annualized income above is monthly income times 12; not a once-a-year annual annuity payment. Payments are based on Annuity 2000 Mortality
Table (Merged Gender Mod 1) with ages set back 2 years. Percentages in table are as a percent of the annualized income amount in each row.
Source : Author’s calculations.
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on TIAA accumulations. Depending on the history and timing of the person’s
contributions to TIAA, the total level of payments available via IPRO will
vary. As of July 2003, the highest interest rate being credited by TIAA was
7.25 percent (for contributions received in 2000 on a RA/GRA), while the
lowest was 3 percent (for contributions made between 7/1/2003 and
9/30/2003 to an SRA/GSRA). Thus, as of this date, IPRO payments could
generate initial income payments equal to between 3 and 7.25 percent of the
total accumulation ($300–725 per year per $10,000 of TIAA accumulation)
depending on when contributions to TIAA were made. Relative to annuity
payments for those aged 61–69, IPRO generally provides income payments
that are somewhat lower than initial annuity payments (on the order of
20–40 percent lower), depending on the age of the annuitant and the
annuity option selected.
The initial amount of income under the MDO can also vary depending on
the age of the participant when distributions begin, and, if applicable, on the
age of the designated beneficiary (and his relation to the participant). For
someone who will be 71 at the end of the year in which distributions are first
required, the minimum required distribution is approximately $382 per year
per $10,000 of accumulation (assuming the beneficiary is not a spouse more
than 10 years younger). This initial income level is substantially below the
level of initial income payments available from life annuities to participants
at this age (on the order of 50–60 percent lower). Systematic Withdrawals
can, of course, provide an arbitrary amount of income, as long as the accu-
mulation supports the payments (and as with all distribution mechanisms,
rules regarding early withdrawals and the minimum required distributions
must be respected with regard to accumulations). The point is that the choice
of income option can dramatically affect the amount of initial income pro-
vided to a participant from his retirement assets. Individuals electing to take
non-annuity options (other than SWAT) are choosing to receive signifi-
cantly lower initial payments. All participants receive materials each year
showing what their initial income payments would be, assuming the use of
specific life annuity options. At retirement, they are also furnished with
retirement illustrations showing how their choice of income option will
affect their income levels. It is extremely unlikely that participants are
unaware that higher initial income payments could be derived through the
use of life-annuity options.10 The choices that individuals are making,
therefore, do appear to be made both willingly and voluntarily, reflecting
consideration of the available options.
Longitudinal Patterns in the Selection of
Retirement Income Options
Next we turn to evidence on the changes in the use of various types of
income streams over time at TIAA-CREF spanning the period 1975–2001.
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Figure 13-2. Initial income selections by TIAA-CREF participants, 1975–2001.
Notes: Participants combining different types of income streams are counted once for each type. Includes only those starting their first income stream.
Source : Author’s calculations based on data from TIAA-CREF Retirement Services Actuarial.
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These data show some remarkable changes over time. In 1975, the only
distribution option available to TIAA-CREF participants was the life annuity
(either single- or joint-life). Figure 13-2 shows that from the late 1970s
through 1984, the single-life annuity was used by a (slight) majority of those
starting an income stream from their retirement assets. From 1985 to 1988,
the joint-life annuity became more popular, covering larger fraction of
participants than the single-life annuity. Part of this shift in choice may be
due to the passage of the Federal Retirement Equity Act of 1984, which pro-
vided that married employees (or employees who were married when they
earned retirement benefits) under a plan governed by ERISA could select
an option other than a two-life annuity under which the spouse is desig-
nated as the second annuitant only if the spouse agreed in writing to forego
the two-life benefit. Figure 13-1 also shows that after the introduction of
non-annuity options in 1989, there has been a dramatic decline in the pro-
portion of participants selecting a life annuity. As of 2001, only 45 percent of
those starting an income stream for the first time chose to use the life annuity,
split roughly evenly between the joint-life and single-life options. We also
see that after its introduction in 1989, few people selected the IPRO option
(5 percent of those beginning any income stream); and its use subsequently
showed a slight relation to 1994. Thereafter, the popularity of this distribu-
tion mechanism climbed, tripling in terms of its share among those starting
income payments (rising to 17 percent in 2001). Since 1991, the greatest
growth has been in the use of the MDO. In 1991, only 1 percent of those
starting an income stream used the MDO, but of 2001, MDO is by 27 percent
of those who start any income stream at all.
Patterns in the Selection of Annuity Options
Patterns by Sex
Table 13-3 presents data on various life-annuity options selected by individ-
uals beginning an annuity income stream over the period 1995–2001.
Table 13-3 is divided into three sections, with the top panel (Panel 1) sim-
ply breaking the relevant annuitant population into two groups, which are
then analyzed separately. Panel 2 focuses on those electing a single-life
annuity, and Panel 3 on those electing a joint-life annuity.
Confirming earlier studies (King, 1996), recent data show that female par-
ticipants are significantly more likely to choose the single-life annuity option
than their male counterparts. In 2001, 68 percent of the females beginn-
ing life-annuity income chose a single-life option, while only 30 percent of
men did so. This pattern is only slightly changed from 1995, when 68 percent
of females chose the single-life and 26 percent of males did so. An obvious
reason for this could be differences in marital status among the female and
male participants beginning an income stream. Unfortunately, historical
data on marital status of participants are not available.
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There are only a few other notable changes over this time period. Among
women, there has been a slight increase in the election of a guaranteed
period on the single-life annuity: of the women choosing a single-life annuity
in 1995, one-third did so without opting for a guarantee period, while as of
2001, only 28 percent did not elect a guarantee. (As the data show, the
largest increase was in the election of a 10-year guarantee.) In addition,
there was a very slight increase in the fraction of female annuitants choos-
ing the “Full to Survivor” survivorship option from 1995 to 2001. There was
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TABLE 13-3 Initial Annuity Income Option Sections, by Sex (1995 and 2001)
Annuity Options Men Women
1995 (%) 2001 (%) 1995 (%) 2001 (%)
Panel 1: Single versus joint
Single-life annuities 25.9 29.5 67.6 68.0
Joint-life annuities 74.1 70.5 32.4 32.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Panel 2: Single-life annuities
No guarantee 35.0 32.3 33.7 28.4
10-year guarantee 24.1 30.5 30.5 33.9
15-year guarantee 16.2 14.3 14.0 15.7
20-year guarantee 23.9 22.9 21.2 21.9
Installment refund 0.9 0.0 0.6 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Panel 3: Joint-life annuities
Full to survivor
No guarantee 8.8 10.0 7.1 9.2
Any guarantee 63.9 60.8 58.6 57.9
All 72.7 70.8 65.7 67.1
Two-thirds to survivor
No guarantee 3.1 4.3 2.2 1.9
Any guarantee 17.7 17.7 13.9 14.1
All 20.8 21.9 16.1 16.0
Half to 2nd annuitant
No guarantee 1.4 1.6 2.3 2.8
Any guarantee 5.0 5.6 15.9 14.1
All 6.4 7.3 18.3 16.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes : “Guarantee” refers to the election of a length of time during which annuity 
payments are not life contingent. “Installment refund” is a guarantee option available 
on a negligible number of older contracts.
Source : Author’s calculations.
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a corresponding decline in the fraction of women choosing the “Half to
Second Annuitant Option,” while the use of the “Two-thirds to Survivor
Option” has remained fairly flat. Among men choosing the single-life
annuity option, there was a similar slight increase in the use of the 10-year
guarantee period from 1995 to 2001. In 1995, 35 percent of males using the
single-life annuity did so without electing a guarantee period; while in
2001, 32 percent did so. At the same time, the use of the 10-year guarantee
rose from 24 to 31 percent in 2001. The evidence for men indicates only
a very slight change in the use of the various survivorship and guarantee
options under the two-life annuity.
For both men and women choosing a joint-life annuity, the data show
a strong preference for the use of the “Full-to-Survivor” option. In addi-
tion, among both men and women there is a strong preference for guaran-
tee periods. Among those electing single-life annuities, roughly two-thirds
chose a guarantee period, while among those electing a joint-life annuity,
over 85 percent opted for a guarantee period.
Patterns by Age
Figure 13-3 depicts time-series patterns in the age distribution of individuals
beginning annuity income over the period 1980–2001.11 It shows that the
fraction of annuitants beginning income streams before the age of 65 rose
gradually from 36 to 44 percent from 1980 to 1987, and it has remained
roughly constant ever since. At the same time, the fraction beginning annu-
ity income at age 65 has fallen by roughly half (from 38 to 17 percent) since
the early 1980s. There has been a fairly steady increase in the proportion
beginning annuity income at ages 66–69, and a significant increase, followed
by a decline after 1991, in the fraction beginning annuity income at ages
70 or 71. The fraction starting annuity payments after the age of 71 increased
slightly in the 1980s, then fell through the early 1990s, and it appears to be
growing again in the early part of the twenty-first century.
There appears to be little change in the average age at which non-annuity
distribution options are used. Since its introduction, the average age of
participants using the minimum distribution option has been between 71 and
72—this is, of course, consistent with the fact that regulations require most
retirees to begin taking minimum distributions by April 1 of the year fol-
lowing the year in which they turn 7012. At the same time, the average age
among those using only IPRO or SWAT is much younger: These averages
have varied between 63 and 64 years. In the case of annuity income streams,
the average age of participants has increased by a year over the period
1988–2001, rising from 63 to 64. Overall, the data show a striking increase
in the overall age at which participants are beginning to start any income
stream at all: The average age at which participants begin to receive any
income stream rose from 63 in 1988 to 66 in 2001.
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Utkas-13.qxd  27/5/04  3:06 PM  Page 251
56–64 65 66–69 70–71 71+
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
0
20
40
60
80
100
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
s
t
a
r
t
i
n
g
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
a
n
n
u
i
t
y
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
36.3 39.0 39.3
41.8 42.8 43.2 43.8 44.3 43.8 43.0 41.8 42.0 43.4 43.4 44.9
45.6 44.3 43.2 43.6 43.6 43.9 43.6
37.7 34.4 33.7
32.2 28.6 29.1 28.2 27.0 25.4 23.9
22.4 21.4 21.9 21.8
21.3 19.9 19.8 19.6 18.8 17.3 18.0 17.3
19.0 19.1 19.2 17.8
18.7 17.8 17.9 18.4
18.6
18.3
19.0 20.0
20.3 21.3 21.1 21.7 22.7 23.0 23.0 23.2 22.1 21.4
5.9 6.5 6.3 6.6 8.4 8.5 7.6 8.2 9.8 12.4 14.5 15.0 13.1
12.0 11.0 10.3 10.3 10.5 10.9 11.8 11.6 12.5
2.32.52.52.12.51.41.41.61.51.11.2 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.5 3.0 3.7 3.8 4.2 4.5 5.2
Year
Figure 13-3. First life annuity issue by age, 1980–2001.
Source : Author’s calculations based on data from TIAA-CREF Retirement Services Actuarial.
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Settlement Sequences
Until 1989, the only type of income stream available to participants was the
life annuity, yet the participant was not required to convert all accumulated
assets to an annuity. As more income options have become available over
time, with features tailored to individuals at different points in the transition
to retirement, many participants have used more than one income option.
(As of 2001, less than 10 percent of those beginning an income stream used
more than one form of distribution initially.)
Table 13-4 illustrates the use of alternative income options by those starting
an income stream for the second time conditional on having chosen a single
type of distribution for the first stream. For example, of those whose first
income choice was a life annuity only, the table shows that 56 percent
added and/or switched to another life annuity on starting a second stream,
while 41 percent added an MDO contract. A small minority added IPRO or
SWAT streams. For those whose first stream was an MDO contract, half
started a life annuity contract as their second choice. While some of this
may be the conversion of MDO contracts to life annuities, the pattern does
not necessarily mean participants are converting their MDOs to annuities:
Many participants still working after age 7012 may have to take minimum
distributions from accumulations earned under a prior employer’s plan—
thus, their first income stream is minimum distributions, although they are
still working. When they do retire, they must begin to take income from
their current employer’s plan as well, which they may decide to take as an
annuity. Almost all others with MDOs only who make a second choice elect
to start another MDO stream. For those whose first choice is IPRO only,
nearly 60 percent begin an annuity as their second choice, while 21 percent
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TABLE 13-4 Patterns in Second Income Stream Selection, 1989–2001
Initial Income Added and/or Switched to
Selection
Life 
Annuity MDO IPRO SWAT More Than Total 
(%) (%) (%) (%) One (%) (%)
Life annuity only 55.5 41.1 1.3 2.0 0.1 100.0
MDO only 50.1 46.4 0.0 3.2 0.3 100.0
IPRO only 58.0 20.6 9.1 8.7 3.5 100.0
SWAT only 10.5 19.4 13.2 55.9 1.0 100.0
Notes : Includes all participants who initially chose a single income option and who make
a second income option decision at least one calendar year after their first election. “MDO”
indicates minimum distribution, “IPRO” is TIAA interest payments, and “SWAT” is a sys-
tematic withdrawal plan.
Source : Author’s calculations.
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choose MDO. Finally, of those who begin an income stream with SWAT only,
the second choice of about 11 percent is a life annuity, 19 percent choose an
MDO, and 13 percent choose IPRO (the remaining individuals begin another
SWAT stream).
Discussion and Conclusions
Our evidence on the payout choices of TIAA-CREF participants evaluated
changes over the period 1995–2001. We show that as non-annuity distribu-
tion options became available to retirees, more of them elected not to use
a life-contingent annuity as a form of payout, at least at or near the time of
retirement. More retiring individuals are electing to allow assets in their
employer-sponsored retirement plans to continue to accumulate without
taking distributions; use “temporary” or “transitional” mechanisms for dis-
tribution of assets that do not involve life-contingencies; and receive only
the minimum amount of distributions needed to avoid federal tax penalties.
We also find that the frequency of retirement at ages younger than
69 remained roughly constant throughout the 1990s. It is, however, likely
that at least some of the changes in the usage of income options, and in
the observed postponement of the usage of retirement assets to generate
income, may be related to the changing nature, rather than the incidence,
of retirement at many US colleges and universities. As retirement has
become less of a discrete transition from working full-time to not working
at all, participants may not need to receive distributions from their retire-
ment assets. The abolition of mandatory retirement rules in 1994, and
changes in the tax treatment of Social Security payments, have also altered
the set of financial constraints facing retirees over time. Increased part-
time work after “retirement” and lower tax penalties on Social Security
payments may also have increased the tax advantage of maintaining assets
in tax-deferred vehicles.
Another important issue is that annuitization is generally an irreversible
investment decision, so people may perceive some benefit to maintaining
their option to start an annuity income stream at a later date. Those who
began income streams without annuitizing over the last decade have used
MDOs and IPROs.12 An IPRO is by its very nature an interim income choice:
At some point it must be annuitized or converted to minimum distribution.
The growing use of this option is therefore perhaps quite consistent with
retirees taking a “wait and see” attitude with regard to annuitization.
The decline in annuitization may be a cause for worry among some, but
it is unclear whether “corrective” policy responses are needed. To the
extent that people value bequests, or that precautionary motives for saving
are a factor, lack of annuitization may simply reflect differences in prefer-
ences. Hence some of the patterns documented here could indicate that
254 John Ameriks
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people do not view maximization of life-contingent retirement income
at the point of retirement as the sole purpose of their retirement savings.
Our evidence, as well as prior studies (e.g. Laitner and Juster, 1996) indicate
substantial demand for “refund” features on immediate life annuity contracts,
both single-life and joint-life. The widespread election of such options is
strong evidence suggestive of a significant bequest motive.
If one admits the possibility that individuals are not well informed or
rational, other explanations can be allowed. For example, Munnell et al.
(2002), argue that as a consequence of psychological biases, older people
may overvalue a “stock” of unannuitized assets relative to a “flow” of annuity
income. If there is a psychological reluctance to give up a stock of assets,
the result may be both underconsumption and unintended bequests.
Unfortunately, it is not clear how one could determine whether the
economic benefits of greater annuitization would offset the psychological
costs. Along the same lines, it is also possible that people may not be under-
standing how annuities work at retirement. Indeed, basic concepts regarding
how and why annuities are an effective and efficient means for financing
consumption are not generally understood even among some financial
professionals. This may play a role in their declining usage as participants
are offered more choices in the distribution phase.
A related issue concerns the increasing use of MDO. Just as Madrian and
Shea (2001) found, for 401(k) plan members it is possible that the deci-
sions of at least some retiring participants may reflect inertia in decision-
making, coupled with the existence of the MDO “default” (i.e. a choice that
results when no alternative, well-considered selection is made) for income
in retirement. Prior to 1989, the life annuity was the “default” (and only)
option for receiving an income stream from a TIAA-CREF pension. After
1991, the MDO effectively became the “default” option, so in the absence
of considering an alternative choice, in order to avoid tax penalties, parti-
cipants may use the MDO. It is even possible that individuals perceive the
minimum distribution required by tax law as a “government sanctioned”
distribution mechanism for their retirement assets. Certainly for pre-retirees,
there is significant inertia with regard to asset allocation decisions: Many
workers never make asset allocation changes even after long periods of
time and large fluctuations in financial markets (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2001).
Likewise, we suspect that at least some participants might adopt the MDO
at age 7012, become more or less comfortable with the amount of income it
provides, and then never reconsider the decision. Whether this is happen-
ing, and what the implications of such behavior might be, are important
areas for future research.
The current menu of non-annuity distribution options has been avail-
able to retirees for less than a decade. Hence, people who were presented
with non-annuity options are still relatively young, and it will take several
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years before it will be clear how successfully they combined income options
to finance the full span of their retirements. It will also take time to learn
whether they will make use of the annuity options available to them later
in life.
Notes
1 We lack information that would allow us to determine how many members of this
“retiree” group may have changed pension carriers or simply changed jobs rather
than retiring. It seems reasonable that career changes at these ages are relatively
infrequent; this calculation is perhaps the best estimate we can currently produce of
whether individuals have retired. Note also that these estimates do not remove those
for whom payments have stopped as a result of death.
2 These data are not strictly comparable to the earlier study, because the 1999 study
tracks one cohort of participants over time, whereas our data here look at retirement
in the overall participant population at a single point in time. For example, the
retirement rates estimated here are slightly (1–5%) higher at younger ages, in part
reflecting higher turnover rates among those who entered the system recently than
among those of the same age who have participated for several years.
3 More information describing the organization, how it operates, and its history
can be found in Greenough, 1990.
4 This form of benefit and the “Full benefit to survivor” option are used in many of
the annuity arrangements made through defined benefit (DB) plans. The “Two-thirds
to Survivor” option is not typical of most DB plans; this option is the only one that
results in lower benefits to the primary annuitant upon the death of the secondary
annuitant.
5 Essentially, the guaranteed period combines a period-certain annuity (i.e. a reverse
amortization) without a life contingency, with the purchase of a deferred contingent life
annuity that begins after the amortization is complete.
6 For further description and details regarding the use of annuities to provide
income in retirement, see Mitchell and McCarthy (2002).
7 The mathematics of variable annuities as well as further details related to the
structure of CREF annuities are described in greater detail in Brown, Mitchell, and
Poterba (2002).
8 The rules governing minimum distributions have had an interesting and convo-
luted history. The IRS issued final regulations governing the required minimum
distributions in April 2002 that clarified and simplified some provisions related to
minimum distributions. For a detailed discussion and analysis of the regulations,
see Warshawsky (1998, 2001).
9 Another form of non-annuity benefit available to most TIAA-CREF participants
is cash withdrawals in the form of a Transfer Payout Annuity (or TPA) and/or a
Retirement Transition Benefit (RTB). The RTB is a lump-sum withdrawal that can be
used at the point of retirement in conjunction with the beginning of life annuity
income, while the TPA is a form of period-certain annuity that must be used to liquid-
ate TIAA balances under the terms of retirement plans that do not allow lump-sum
withdrawals from TIAA.
10 For all payment mechanisms (other than an extremely low and therefore indefi-
nitely supportable level of fixed systematic withdrawals) the amount of income that
the participant will receive will change over time, reflecting investment performance
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and other factors. All TIAA-CREF pension annuities have a least some variable
component.
11 These data differ slightly from those presented by King (1996), as a result of
difference in the way that ages and start dates are prepared here. The overall
patterns are very similar.
12 Of course, the SWAT mechanism has been available for a significantly shorter
period of time.
References
Ameriks, John. 1999. “The Retirement Patterns and Annuitization Decisions of a
Cohort of TIAA-CREF Participants.” TIAA-CREF Research Dialogues 60. TIAA-CREF.
Ameriks, John and Stephen P. Zeldes. 2001. “How Do Household Portfolio Shares
Vary with Age?” Columbia University Working Paper. New York.
Ashenfelter, Orley and David Card. 2002. “Did the Elimination of Mandatory
Retirement Affect Faculty Retirement?” American Economic Review 92(4): 
957–980.
Brown, Jeffrey, Thomas Davidoff, and Peter S. Diamond. 2003. “Annuities and
Individual Welfare.” NBER Working Paper 9714.
—— , Olivia S. Mitchell, and James Poterba. 2002. “Mortality Risk, Inflation Risk,
and Annuity Products.” In Innovations in Financing Retirement, eds. Olivia S.
Mitchell, Zvi Bodie, P. Brett Hammond, and Stephen Zeldes. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press: 175–197.
—— , Olivia S. Mitchell, James Poterba, and Mark Warshawsky. 2001. The Role of
Annuity Markets in Financing Retirement. Boston: MIT Press.
Easterlin, Richard A., Christine M. Schaeffer, and Diane J. Macunovich. 1993. “Will
the Baby Boomers Be Less Well Off Than Their Parents? Income, Wealth and
Family Circumstances Over the Life Cycle in the United States.” Population and
Development Review 19(3): 497–522.
Engen, Eric M., William G. Gale and Cori E. Uccello. 1999. “The Adequacy of
Retirement Saving.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2: 65–187.
Friedman, Benjamin and Mark J. Warshawsky. 1990. “The Cost of Annuities:
Implications for Savings Behavior and Bequests.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
105(1): 135–154.
Greenough, William C. 1990. It’s My Retirement Money—Take Good Care of It: The
TIAA-CREF Story. Homewood: Irwin.
Hammond, P. Brett. 1996. “Real Bonds and Inflation Protection for Retirement.”
TIAA-CREF Research Dialogues 47.
Holden, Sarah and Jack L. Vanderhei. 2002. “Can 401(k) Accumulations Generate
Significant Income for Future Retirees?” EBRI Issue Brief 251.
King, Francis P. 1995. “The TIAA Graded Payment Method and the CPI.” TIAA-CREF
Research Dialogues 46.
—— 1996. “Trends in the Selection of TIAA-CREF Life-Annuity Income Options,
1978–1994.” TIAA-CREF Research Dialogues 48.
Laitner, John and F. Thomas Juster. 1996. “New Evidence on Altruism: A Study of
TIAA-CREF Retirees.” The American Economic Review 86(4): 893–908.
Madrian, Brigitte C. and Dennis F. Shea. 2001. “The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in
401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(4):
1149–1187.
13 / How do Retirees Go from Stock to Flow? 257
Utkas-13.qxd  27/5/04  3:06 PM  Page 257
Mitchell, Olivia S. and David McCarthy. 2002. “Annuities for an Ageing World.”
Pension Research Council Working Paper 2002–12.
—— , James Poterba, Mark Warshawsky, and Jeffrey Brown. 1999. “New Evidence on
the Money’s Worth of Individual Annuities.” American Economic Review 89(2):
321–360.
Moore, James F. and Olivia S. Mitchell. 1999. “Projected Retirement Wealth and
Saving Adequacy.” In Forecasting Retirement Needs and Retirement Wealth, eds. Olivia
S. Mitchell, P. Brett Hammond, and Anna M. Rappaport. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press: 68–94.
Munnell, Alicia H., Annika Sundén, Mauricio Soto, and Catherine Taylor. 2002.
“How Will the Rise in 401(k) Plans Affect Bequests?” Center for Retirement
Research at Boston College Issues in Brief.
Warshawsky, Mark J. 1998. “Distributions from Retirement Plans: Minimum
Requirements, Current Options, and Future Directions.” TIAA-CREF Research
Dialogue 57.
—— 2001. “Further Reform of Minimum Distribution Requirements For Retire-
ment Plans.” Tax Notes 91(2): 297–306.
—— and John Ameriks. 1999. “How Prepared Are Americans for Retirement?” In
Forecasting Retirement Needs and Retirement Wealth, eds. Olivia S. Mitchell, P. Brett
Hammond, and Anna M. Rappaport. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press: 33–67.
Wolff, Edward N. 2002. Retirement Insecurity: The Income Shortfalls Awaiting the Soon-
to-Retire. Washington DC: Economic Policy Institute.
Yaari, Menahem E. 1965. “Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of
the Consumer.” Review of Economic Studies 32: 137–150.
258 John Ameriks
Utkas-13.qxd  27/5/04  3:06 PM  Page 258
